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The multifaceted nature of anti-corruption work demands a sophisticated account of ways in 
which organizations can collaborate. This article seeks to develop a framework for studying 
collaborations of anti-corruption work. Based on interviews and document analyses, it investigates 
Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Finland, and Norway on their experiences. The article provides 
a discussion on types of collaboration based on five dimensions: the type of corruption; the kind of 
anti-corruption work; the purpose of collaboration; the nature of collaboration; and the actors of the 
collaboration. The article argues that going forward we should build anti-corruption networks by 
deliberately linking existing organizations through the idea of collaborative governance.   
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 Corruption continues the most complex and wicked problems of our time. It is no longer 
simple bribery by officials but involves diverse actors operating in complex exchanges using 
sophisticated mechanisms (Sousa et al 2009). It can be related to international trade in arms and 
oil, infrastructure investments, humanitarian aid, for instance, using offshore accounts. It is often, 
also, related to policy-making, political campaigns, budget frauds, and multinational companies 
(Hiatt 2007; Fletcher and Herrmann 2012). While, most governments have established anti-
corruption agencies and laws, practitioners and scholars have, surprisingly, failed to integrate 
collaborative governance in curbing corruption. How some countries, which are perceived to have 
low levels of corruption, are handling this problem is what interests the author. How can agencies 
collaborate to work on anti-corruption? The complex nature of corruption and the multifaceted 
nature of anti-corruption work demands for a framework for answering such question.  
 
This article seeks to answer two questions. First, what kinds of collaboration exist in anti-
corruption work? Second, how does collaboration enhance anti-corruption effectiveness and what 
are the challenges? This article provides a fresh analysis of issues on who to collaborate with, when 
to collaborate, what to collaborate on, and how to sustain the collaboration.  
 




The next section introduces literature on anti-corruption and collaboration, followed by rationale 
for country selection in the methods section. I, then, provide a descriptive overview of the six 
countries – Japan, Finland, Singapore, Sweden, South Korea, and Norway - and some comparative 
analysis. Based on inductive-reasoning from the cases, a new framework is introduced and utilized 
in the section that follows. This is followed by a discussion of the key lessons for anti-corruption 
collaboration work. The last section concludes with ideas for future research. 
 
What do we know about anti-corruption and collaborative governance?  
Studies on anti-corruption agencies have not taken adequate consideration of the 
collaborative relationships among institutions. Similarly, studies on collaboration do not adequately 
encompass the issue of corruption vis-à-vis other issues like social and health services.  
 
Anti-Corruption  
There is a large number of studies on corruption, that includes types of corruption, 
definitions of corruption, decision-making in corruption, cultural aspects of corruption, socio-
economic aspects of corruption, and demand and supply of corruption (e.g. Klitgaard 1988; Rose-
Ackerman 1978; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Graycar and Smith 2011). This article will not attempt to 
describe all types of corruption. However, it is important to mention key typologies. The first is 
based on the amount of money involved – petty or grand amounts. The second is based on the 
frequency of occurrence – ad hoc or systemic cases. And the third is based on which part of the 
policy process it occurred – policy-making or implementation or evaluation.  
 
The nature of corruption is changing in five aspects, which makes it more difficult than ever to work 
in silos. They are the intensity of corruption, the cyclical nature of corruption, the growing 
complexity of corruption, the high profile and systematic nature of corruption, and the 
transnational nature of corruption (Sousa, Larmour, and Hindess 2009). 
 
The importance of having ‘political will’ to curb corruption is often mentioned in literature (Quah 
1999; Pope and Vogl 2000; Kpundeh and Dininio 2006). However relying to political will is 
unrealistic because politicians are often the culprits (Fritzen 2005). As the institutional approach 
has become predominant, increasing importance is given to comprehensive design of institutions 
with appropriate level and scope of power (Fritzen 2005). The most prominent debate is on the 




Through the work of Transparency International (TI) since 1993, anti-corruption work is brought 
to the forefront of many international organizations (Sousa et al 2009; Larmour and Hindess 2009). 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003 advocated for establishment 
of an agency or several agencies to prevent corruption and enforce anti-corruption laws. The EU 
also recommends all members to set up ACAs (Sousa 2009). Currently there are over 80 ACAs in the 
world (Charron 2008). 
 
ACAs are often thought of as stand-alone institutions. Charron (2008) describes ACAs to be distinct 
from other government agencies, permanent in nature, publicly funded, accountable to at least one 
other government body, has preventive and repressive functions of corruption control, centralize 
information on domestic corruption, accessible to the public. There are several types of ACA 
arrangements: single agency, multiple agencies, no agency, ad hoc agency (Quah 2001; Meagher 
2005). Based on functional analysis, there are four models: universal model, investigative model, 
parliamentary model and multiple-agency model (Heilbrunn 2004). Meagher (2005) states six 
factors that enhance the success of ACAs: clear authority; accountability mechanisms; adequate 
power; adequate resources; support from civil society; and cooperation from other public agencies. 
Doig (2009) argues to match workload, management and resources for newly setup ACAs.  
 
In response to traditional ways of organizing public sector services and regulatory approaches, 
recently scholars are beginning to observe the ‘governance’ of anti-corruption work. This is to look 
at using hierarchies, markets, and communities as social organizations to form the architect of anti-
corruption institutions (Sousa et al 2009). For example Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations (UN), the World 
Bank, and TI have advocated for anti-corruption institutions to work with civil society 
organizations (CSOs). Sousa et al (2009) have coined the term ‘integrity warriors’ to mean official 
anti-corruption agencies and civil societies. The links between these actors is a form of ‘network 
governance’ as defined by Rhodes in 1997 (Sousa et al 2009). 
 
With regards to what these actors do, there are three aspects of anti-corruption work (Doig, Watt, 
and Williams 2007; Meagher 2005). 
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1) Punishment or prosecution of corruption. These include response to complaints, 
intelligence monitoring and investigation, evidence gathering, case management, recovery 
of assets, and updating laws.  
2) Prevention of corruption. These includes work on codes of conduct, transparent 
procurement and financial systems, auditing and public reporting, declaration of asset and 
income, whistle blower protection and conflict of interests laws, and research  
3) Promotion of awareness of corruption in society. These include activities of providing 
public information, education and outreach, training officials, sharing of knowledge, 
campaigning through mainstream media and social media. 
 
There is a great need to systematically study how more than one agency can come together to 
combat corruption. For the purpose of building a framework, we now turn to the literature on 
collaboration and network.  
 
Collaboration and Network 
Studies of inter-agency relations are not new in the field of public administration. Initial 
studies focused on intergovernmental relations (e.g. Wright 1988). It has always been a challenge 
for public agencies to coordinate programs across agencies. Problems that arise are such as power 
struggle over resources, turf protection, authority, and credit for outputs and outcomes (Bardach 
1998). Currently, studies of inter-organization coordination have evolved into studies of multi-
organizational settings, public-private-partnerships, networks, and collaboration (Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001; Milward and Provan 2006; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997b; Klijn, Steijn, and 
Edelenbos 2010; O'Toole 1997; Mandell 2001).  
 
Covering all type of relationships and entities, the overarching concept of collaboration refers to the 
process of operating in multi-organizational arrangements, including both vertical and horizontal 
relations, to solve problems that cannot be solved by single organizations (Agranoff and McGuire 
2001). Collaborative governance emphasizes participation by stakeholders, members of the 
collaboration in joint decision-making (Koliba, Meek, and Zia 2011; Bingham and O’Leary 2008; 
Ansell and Gash 2007). 
 
Networks are multi-organizational arrangements that have multiple-nodes, multiple-linkages, and 
non-hierarchical arrangements between organizations (O’Toole 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; 
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McGuire 2006). Aspects of networks that can be studied include: the types of networks 
differentiated by depth, scope, function, stickiness - how close are members, and objectives; 
management of networks; design of networks; effectiveness of networks. Agranoff and McGuire 
(1998) identifies three types of networks: 1) policy making and/or implementing; 2) resource 
exchange, sharing of funding, information, manpower; 3) project-based, partnerships for planning 
and implementation of projects. In this paper, network is considered a form of collaboration.  
 
Public agencies that can be a part of anti-corruption collaborations include: ACAs; police; public 
prosecutors; courts; Ombudsman; independent commissions; advisory groups; presidential or 
parliamentary committees; and audit institutions. Other agencies are such as anti-money 
laundering agency; customs and immigration; fair competition committees; and special 
investigation agencies. More international reports are covering the need to network or build 
coalitions. 
 
Existing international institutions for governments to collaborate are such as the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), The United Nations Global Program Against Corruption 
(GPAC), the United Nations International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination (IGAC), The OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
and Council of Europe: Group of States Against Corruption (Fletcher and Herrmann 2012). 
Examples of private and CSO actors are such as professional associations, chamber of commerce, 
business groups, local TI chapters, local NGOs. Global Transparency Initiative (GTI), Trace 
International, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Global Witness, Partnership for 
Transparency Fund (PTF), and Global Integrity are examples of international NGOs working on 
corruption (Fletcher and Herrmann 2012). 
 
Existing research on anti-corruption collaboration includes a study of city-level anti-corruption 
network (Anechiarico 2010) and the study of official and unofficial actors in the anti-corruption 
landscape in Southeastern Europe (Sampson 2009). Transparency International (TI) has been 
studied as the builder of large-scale social engineering of coalitions to fight corruption, which is 
called National Integrity Systems – NIS (Lindsey and Dick 2002; Hindess 2009; TI 2000). 
Unfortunately, NIS has also been criticized for being a checklist and for not giving workable models 




Problems regarding collaboration emanate from the classic dilemma of how to balance the division 
of authority and labor between agencies and the collaboration among them. These include debates 
on hierarchical orders of the relationships and the level of independence from each other (Pope and 
Vogl 2000). We can expect anti-corruption networks to face the same problems as any other type of 
network, such as funding, trust, information and power sharing, goal alignment, accountability, and 
day-to-day management. It would also face technical challenges in detecting corruption and 
collecting information, as well as, resistance from a long list of culprits in society. After a brief 
explanation of the methods, the following sections will elaborate on these issues. 
 
Methods 
This research adopts the information-oriented case selection strategy by choosing 
outstanding cases of highly effective anti-corruption work (Flyvbjerg 2006). This ‘extreme case 
sampling’ method allows for parameters to investigate success cases in-depth and is suited for 
getting the point across in a dramatic way (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229). The sampling method does not 
allow for generalizing the findings, but it greatly contributes to initial understandings of 
collaboration in anti-corruption work. The aim of this article is not to count frequencies of 
occurrences nor is it to prove theory on collaboration but rather to start a discourse on 
collaboration for anti-corruption work.  
 
The countries were selected based on their perceived low levels of corruption measured by surveys 
of TI1, location, and ACA arrangements (See table 1). Three are in Asia - Japan, South Korea, and 
Singapore - and three are in Europe - Sweden, Finland, and Norway.  
 
Table 1: Country Cases 
Institutions Country 
No agency Japan, Finland 
Single agency Singapore, Sweden 
Multiple agencies  South Korea, Norway 
 
Japan and Finland do not have specific ACAs. Singapore and Sweden each have one strong ACA. 
South Korea and Norway explicitly rely on multiple agencies. This variety allows us to explore 
collaborations in different scenarios. Of the cases, South Korea seems an anomaly because of its not-
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so-low perception index. However, it has improved greatly over the years and can provide lessons 
for other countries. Lastly, we must take note that these countries are all unitary systems. 
 
Data derives from official documents, secondary sources and in-depth interviews collected between 
2007-2010. The agencies studied vary from country to country. They include ACAs, prosecutors, 
police, media, private sector, and CSOs. Questions were asked on general anti-corruption strategies 
and on whether they collaborated with other agencies, what was done, how it worked and why.  
 
It is arguable that it is unclear whether the rankings by TI show the ‘effectiveness of policies or just 
the consequence of a favorable context’ (Vries 2010). There is no doubt that there are factors that 
contribute to the perceived success that probably has very little to do with collaboration. They are 
such as high level of economic development, strong accountability systems, and culture of openness 
for the Scandinavian countries. However, I have chosen to start with these atypical cases to form 
initial understandings the existing collaborations. The following section describes an overview of 
the six countries.  
 
Overview of the Countries 
1) Japan 
Japan does not have an ACA and a special anti-corruption law. Traditionally the police have 
been the main agency to enforce laws and order, include corruption cases. One interviewee 
explained that during the Meiji Restoration period many samurai became policemen so the high 
integrity culture was carried over to the modern police force (Interview Japanese journalist, 21 
December 2007). Other agencies that play an indirect role are the Fair Trade Commission and the 
National Personnel Authority. 
The most prominent aspect from the Japanese case is the strong network of a large civil society 
group called the Citizens Ombudsman Group (TI 2006). Established since 1994, this network 
comprises of 60 sub-groups located in the prefectures. Members are mainly volunteer lawyers and 
accountants. Its aim is to push for transparency at the local level by enforcing the Information 





Finland, also, does not have an ACA. Corruption is not a public problem grave enough to draw 
the attention of lawmakers (Interview Finish official, 24 May 2008). Factors that enhance a corrupt-
free society in Finland, includes the legalistic administrative culture and clear laws prohibiting civil 
servants to receive gifts, as the saying goes “to accept a warm beer and cold sandwich is ok, to 
accept a cold beer and warm sandwich is not” (Email interview Pasi Polonen, 26 March 2009).   
 
However, as there is a rise in corruption involving Finish nationals and problems of conflict of 
interests or ‘trading in influence’, anti-corruption strategies are beginning to emerge (Interview TI 
Finland, 23 May 2008; Salminen, Viinamäki, and Ikola-Norrbacka 2007). As of 2009, the fight 
against corruption is a mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Chancellor of Justice 
and the Parliament Ombudsman monitors actions of civil servants. In addition, the police and the 
public prosecutors also have important roles. Similar to Japan, in Finland, the public highly trusts 
the police (Kääriäinen 2008). 
 
Despite not having an ACA, Finland has a network called the Anti-Corruption Co-ordination Group. 
This network has representatives from the Ministry of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, 
Finance, Trade and Industry, the Confederation of Finnish Industries, the Central Chamber of 
Commerce, the Finnish Municipal Association, the Office of Prosecutor-General, the Controller’s 
Office, and TI Finland, in total 18 members and a secretary (Email interview Pasi Polonen, 26 March 
2009). Its aim is broad including joint planning and coordination of execution at the highest level; 
provision of guidelines to State, municipal, and private sectors; promote detection investigation and 
prosecution; coordinate implementation of international agreements.   
3) Singapore 
Perceived as the least corrupted in Asia, Singapore has had a long history of tackling 
corruption. As early as 1871, it enacted the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements, and in 1960 came 
the Prevention of Corruption Act.  
 
Singapore has a strong agency called the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (since 
1952). Due to the presumption that the police were corrupted this bureau emanated from an older 
police unit. Comprehensively focusing on public and private corruption, it has evolved into an 
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intelligence unit on all kinds of corruption (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). It focuses 
predominantly on deterrence strategies.  
 
As an outcome of the ‘whole-of-government’ approach, where horizontal collaboration is mandated, 
CPIB regularly collaborates across government agencies, including the police. It also collaborates 
loosely with the private sector, such as the Singapore Business Federation, the Medical Council, the 
construction industry, and multinational corporations. It raises awareness through collaborations 
with the Civil Service College and the ministry of education as well as universities and the media. 
These collaborations enhanced CPIB’s expertise on corruption (Interview CPIB official, 22 April 
2008).  
4) Sweden 
The image of clean Sweden is an outcome of good political and legal systems, efficient and 
transparent bureaucracy, and high trust between public officials and citizens (Andersson 2008). 
However, recent studies indicate that Swedes perceive the politicians and public officials to be 
more corrupted than before (Linde and Erlingsson 2013).   
 
Like Norway and Japan, corruption in Sweden is a serious economic crime. Dating back to 1734, the 
first law against bribery among judges and state governors was promulgated. The principle that all 
government documents are considered public documents has been in place since the 18th century.  
 
The main ACA is the National Anti-Corruption Unit (NACU). Established in 2003, it has only 5 
prosecutors. Other agencies include the Swedish National Economics Crime Bureau (ECB), the 
National Council for Crime Prevention, the Committee of the Constitution, the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, the Chancellor of Justice, the Swedish National Audit Office, and the Administrative 
Development Agency (VERVA). Together with VERVA, NACU set up a network called National Anti-
Corruption Network to foster anti-corruption culture and share best practices (GRECO 2005). 
Sweden’s web of institutes above ‘plays an extraordinary supervisory role’ in making sure civil 






5) South Korea  
South Korea suffered from large-scale corruption throughout its developmental stages but over 
the years it has improved considerably in curbing corruption (Kang 2002; You 2009). Since 2008, 
Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of Korea (ACRC) have been leading anti-corruption 
strategies. This institution was a merger of three institutions: the Korea Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (KICAC), the Ombudsman, and the Administrative Appeals Commission. This 
reflects the fact that South Korea has always distributed anti-corruption work to multiple agencies.  
Pushed by CSOs2, activities of Korean Pact on Anti-Corruption and Transparency or the K-PACT 
network (set up in 2005) suggests that South Korea has very active collaboration between public, 
private and civil society sectors.3  The network was setup in response to the criticism that there was 
lack of coordination, which led to the hegemonic struggle of relevant organizations (Kim 2003). The 
network promulgated the Citizen’s Charter for a transparent society and helped pushed for 
prevention of corruption laws and guidelines. 
6) Norway 
Domestically, Norway is concerned with ‘conflict of interest’ at the local level. “Because we are 
very small, there seems to be potential conflict of interest everywhere” said one interviewee 
(Interview with TI Norway, 19 May 2008).  Internationally, Norway is concerned with the growing 
cases of private sector investments, and development aid (Interview with TI Norway, 19 May 
2008).  
 
The main ACA is the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic 
and Environmental Crime or Okokrim (since 1989). It has only 7 people that manage corruption 
cases. Okokrim has a unique design that it is under both the National Police Directorate (especially 
for budget and management) and the Director General of Public Prosecution (especially for file 
court cases).  It focuses on deterrence by making sure that important criminal proceedings send 
effective signals to the public. Corruption has never been a main issue thus anti-corruption work is 
also distributed to other agencies such as the Financial Supervisory Authority, the Directorate of 
Taxes, the Customs and Excise, and the Competition Authority, and the economic crime unit of the 




In sum, the dominant type of collaboration is among public agencies. Singapore, Sweden, South 
Korea, and Norway showed high levels of this, especially Singapore where the government is very 
strong. Despite not having an ACA, unlike Japan, with external pressure from EU, Finland has 
managed set up an anti-corruption network.  
 
In the Scandinavian countries, many lose collaborations with CSOs were found. As for in Asia, CSOs 
are part of formal collaborations only in South Korea. This is due to the relatively higher level of 
corruption that has drawn the attention of South Korean CSOs. In Singapore CSOs are not as vibrant 
and there is very minimal culture of working with CSOs on corruption. In Japan, while the CSOs are 
vibrant but there is little channel for collaboration with government. This is partly due to the lack of 
a government-led network, a core agency, and external pressures to change the status quo.  
 
In addition, European countries demonstrate wider collaboration with other governments and 
international organizations than Asian cases. This is due to the influence of the EU community and 
the absence of an equivalent in Asia. GRECO4 in Europe plays an important role to push for 
collaboration. Furthermore, Scandinavian countries focus on corrupt practices by their nationals 
overseas. Thus they have more examples of international collaborations. Lastly, transparency in 
government is deep-rooted in the Scandinavian countries’ culture, while it is relatively new for 
Asians.  
 
Framework: Varieties of Collaboration for Anti-Corruption Work 
 
Beyond descriptions, based on the proposed framework, this section analyzes selected 
collaborations found in each country. Drawing from the typologies of anti-corruption work and the 
models of collaboration, table 3 illustrates five dimensions of how anti-corruption collaborations 
can be designed. They are 1) the types of corruption; 2) the kind of anti-corruption work; 3) the 





Table 2: Possible combinations of collaboration for anti-corruption work 
1. Types of 
Corruption (TC) 
 Petty or Large 
 Ad hoc or 
Systemic 
 Policy-making or 
Implementation 





 Prevention of 
corruption  




3. Purpose of 
Collaboration (PC) 
 Sharing power 
 Sharing resources  
 Joint planning  
 Joint execution  
 Joint evaluation  
4. Nature of 
Collaboration  (NC) 
 Vertical or 
horizontal 
relations 




5. Actors in the Collaboration (AC) 
International: International NGO, International Organizations, Regional bodies: EU, ASEAN, and 
other governments.  
Domestic: ACAs, Police, Prosecutor, Courts, Ombudsman, Commissions such as the Fair Competition 
Commission, Business associations, Media, CSOs.  
 
Practitioners can utilize this framework for designing anti-corruption collaborations and scholars 
can use it for analytical purposes. There are numerous ways to combine the five dimensions. Each 
combination serves differing purposes and is suitable for different contexts. This is not an equation 
nor a model but rather a suggested framework to dissect anti-corruption collaborations.  
 
Collaboration in Anti-Corruption Work = TC + AW + PC + NC + AC 
 
Table 4 shows selected key collaborations and assessments of effectiveness. The cases 
illustrate the same spectrum of possibilities for collaborative anti-corruption work regardless of 
whether they had an ACA, multiple agencies, or no agency.  
 




Combination of the collaboration for 
anti-corruption work 






TC = implementation of policies 
AW = punishment and investigation  
PC = sharing resources and joint planning  
A collection of lawyers, the 
collaboration has succeeded to 
prosecute a number of local 
politicians. The goal for the 
collaboration is clear and the 
collaboration grew organically. 
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NC = Horizontal, loose network that has a 
small secretariat  
AC: CSOs and media 
In close collaboration with 
investigative journalists, it 
focuses on transparency of 
public spending and collection 







TC = All types of corruption, specifically 
acts of corruption by Finish nationals 
abroad  
AW = Mainly punishment and prevention 
PC = Sharing resources and joint 
planning  
NC = Horizontal, tight relations, with a 
network secretariat.  
AC: Key government agencies and CSOs 
This collaboration reincarnated 
3 times in 2002, 2005 and 
2008. It has been strengthened 
with endorsement from the 
Council of Europe’s Group of 
States Against Corruption 
(GRECO). Formed mainly under 
external pressure from the EU, 
this collaboration is at the early 
stages of development.  It aims 
to conduct strategic planning at 
the high-level and coordinate 









bilateral  & 
horizontal 
collaborations. 
TC = Petty and large scale cases, mainly 
ad hoc cases, focuses on the policy 
implementation stage  
AW = Mainly punishment and prevention. 
Some promotion of awareness.  
PC = Only to share resources 
NC = Vertical, tight relations, with CPBI 
taking a clear lead role  
AC: Key government agencies 
Singapore has been praised for 
effective corruption control due 
to CPIB’s capacity and scope of 
power – investigative and 
punishment. CPIB’s 
collaboration with other 
agencies reflects Singapore’s 
Whole-of-Government 
approach, which emphasizes 
the no-wrong-door policy 
where agencies are mandated 
to collaborate and coordinate at 
all time.  
Sweden  
(single ACA) 




TC = All types of corruption 
AW = Focuses on promotion of anti-
corruption awareness and change in 
certain cultures  
PC = Sharing resources and joint 
planning 
NC = Vertical, lose relations with NACU 
taking the lead  
AC: Key government agencies, private 
sector, CSOs 
Sweden’s anti-corruption work 
reflects a system that is ideal, 
where there is an agency that is 
effective and is open to 
working with other agencies. 
Similar to Finland, through 
GRECO, Sweden was externally 
pushed to setup a network. 
Since it had NACU, the network 
strived because there was a 
clear leading agency compared 
to Finland’s case.  
South Korea  
(multiple 
ACAs) 





TC = Large, systemic, policy-making and 
implementation levels of corruption 
AW = Prevention of corruption, and 
promotion of anti-corruption awareness 
K-PACT was largely successful 
in pushing for legislative 
change, incentivizing reporting 
of corruption among the public, 
and raising awareness. The 
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NGO actors.  PC =Share power, resource, joint 
planning, execution, and evaluation  
NC = Horizontal, tight relations, with 
strong secretariat and clear division of 
labor  
AC: Key government agencies, political 
units, private sector, and CSOs 
collaboration was designed 
carefully by specifying 
proportion of shared resources, 








TC = Large, systemic type of corruption, 
focuses on the policy-making and 
implementation levels 
AW = Prevention of corruption by setting 
new norms and rules 
PC = Share resources and joint planning 
NC = Horizontal, lose relations with 
Okokrim as point of contact  
AC: Key government agency, 
international NGO, and the private sector  
Okokrim’s collaboration with 
Transparency Norway and the 
private sector has led to the 
setting up of Extractive 
Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in 2007, to 
advocate transparency and 
integrity in the oil, natural gas, 
and mining industries. This has 
changed the norms and rules 
internationally for these 
industries, which are 
considered very corrupted.  
 
Even when agencies want to collaborate, often they start the collaboration without really knowing 
who to work with, what to work on, and how to carryout the collaboration. The selected cases 
provide insights into how some collaboration have been more successful than others.  
 
How collaboration can lead to better effectiveness of anti-corruption work?  
 
Collaboration can lead to effectiveness in four ways. First, collaboration can be used for 
sharing knowledge, expertise, information that is related to anti-corruption work. It can be used for 
joint planning, execution, and evaluation of anti-corruption strategies. Second, collaborations foster 
learning across organizations, sectors, and countries. Third, new values and definitions can arise 
from collaborations. And fourth, collaborations can help withstand changes in political will towards 
fighting corruption. It provides a safety net so that anti-corruption work does not rely on prominent 
individuals or any single agency.  
 
For example, in the past there was high incidence of corruption among police personnel in 
Singapore, so CPIB never worked closely with them (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). 
CPIB saw itself as the cop to catch all the bad guys and saw the need to remain independent from 
other agencies (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). Around the year 2000, realizing the 
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need to engage others, rather than thinking of others as the ‘target’ of their work, CPIB began to see 
them as  ‘stakeholders’ (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). “The bad guys do not divide 
their corruption according to the bureaucratic structure” he said (Interview with CPIB official, 22 
April 2008). CPIB then began to build close collaborations with others, including the police, the 
immigration bureau, and the central narcotics control.  
 
Furthermore, CPIB realized that the public and private sectors are so closely intertwined that it did 
not make sense to focus only on the public sector. Taking on both sectors is a more ‘holistic 
approach’ (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). Thus Singapore’s ACA is one of the few in 
Asia that comprehensively studies all types of corruption. These mindset changes to collaborate 
more led to new values and definition of corruption, which has contributed to Singapore’s success 
in punishing and preventing corruption of all kinds.  
 
Concrete activities of CPIB’s collaborations include training of new employees, seminars for 
policemen on ethical issues, joint meetings with the police at the middle and executive levels, and 
exchange of information on criminal cases. As a result insiders detected more cases because they 
were more knowledgeable. “In a way, it created a self-detection system within the public sector” 
said an official (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008). The collaboration is understood to 
have prevented corruption among new junior police officials and within 10 years the culture of 
corruption among policemen was eradicated (Interview with CPIB official, 22 April 2008).  
 
We can draw another example from Sweden’s NACU. NACU’s scope of work covers the entire 
country, including international cases that involve Swedish nationals. NACU relies mainly on its 
own funding except for occasional special funding from the Ministry of Justice and Foreign Office 
for joint work with OECD (Interview via email with NACU, 1 April 2009). It has only 5 prosecutors 
and 2 economists. Each prosecutor takes about 25 cases per year. Thus, the only way they can work 
effectively is through collaboration with other agencies in a network (Interview NACU officials, 21 
May 2008). In fact, NACU itself is kept very small and is mandated to collaborate. ‘Our work is 
focused on identifying which external resources are needed, where they can be found, and who best 
to collaborate with’ said a NACU representative (Interview NACU official, 21 May 2008). NACU 
collaborates with the local and regional police, public prosecutors, procurement agencies, insurance 
agencies, immigration department, and regulators of finance markets and exports. For example in a 
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criminal case, the investigation team would comprise of at least one prosecutor from NACU and two 
police officers. (Interview with NACU officer, 21 May 2008).  
 
The National Anti-Corruption Network was established to enhance collaboration among public 
agencies, analyze risk areas for corruption, and work out anti-corruption strategies (Email 
interview with NACU, 1 April 2009). Its focus is on several aspects including procurement 
processes, overseas aids, social insurance, immigration, court processes, the capital market, and the 
export industries. Also NACU collaborates in strategic matters with an institute specialized in 
research on crime and takes part in OECD’s strategic work in the implementation of Anti-Bribery 
Instruments. It also works with other governments through the European Union’s Judicial 
Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) to augment investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border 
and organized crime; and through International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) 
(Interview via email with NACU, 1 April 2009).  All of these collaborations are part of the web for 
anti-corruption work, which makes Sweden’s network very strong and sustainable.  
 
Is it better to have an ACA or not for collaborations? 
 
It is easier to start collaborations if there is a focal point in government working on the 
issue. Sweden’s NACU and its National Anti-Corruption Network is a case in point (described 
above). However, in cases where the state is very strong, it might be difficult for CSOs to take part in 
the collaboration. Singapore as a success case for horizontal collaboration among government 
agencies is a good example of this problem. Where there is a single ACA, it is more likely that 
government-led collaborations are formed.  
 
In places where there are multiple agencies, such as South Korea and Norway, there are more 
opportunities to include CSOs and the private sector. These collaborations usually aim to have long-
term impact by changing laws and raising awareness.  
 
Compared to other countries, Japan’s CSOs faced difficulties in collaborating with government. Not 
having an ACA was one of the reasons. But in Finland’s case, despite not having a key agency, they 
were able to set up an anti-corruption network. However, this was due mainly to external pressure 




In sum, it is useful to have a focal agency on anti-corruption. But in order to include CSOs and 
private sectors in multiple layers of collaborations, it might be best to have multiple agencies in 
charge of corruption in addition to the focal agency. This allows for more organic emergence of 
collaborations across sectors.  
 
Is it better to work on certain types of corruption and anti-corruption work?  
 
Collaborations are more effective when members know exactly what kind of corruption 
they are working on and what they want to specifically achieve. The fact that the Japanese Citizens 
Ombudsman network focused only on law enforcement (i.e. punishment/ enforcement of rules) and 
only on scrutinizing expenditure of politicians at the local level (i.e. petty and systemic corruption 
during implementation of policies), gave them great results to prevent corruption and to bring law 
suits against corrupted officials. They demanded to see receipts of payments made to politicians for 
meeting attendances. Despite the relatively small amount of money, the principle of transparency 
and integrity penetrated to the society and local politicians (Interview Japan Ombudsman, 21 
December 2007).  
 
Another example is Norwegian Okokrim’s collaboration with TI Norway and the oil businesses to 
change the practice of oil, natural gas, and mining industries. They focused on prevention by 
making the effort to change laws and standards on large systemic problems of the oil industries. 
The result is the setup of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007. With 
Okokrim’s support, TI Norway also developed the “Business Principles for Countering Bribery” with 
companies worldwide.  The target is to prevent corruption by Norwegian nationals overseas.  
 
Thus it is better to have a clear idea on the types of corruption (e.g. ad hoc/systemic, petty/large, 
policy-making/implementation/evaluation) and the kind of anti-corruption work (punishment, 
prevention, promotion of awareness) for the collaboration. Certain kind of work will be more 
difficult to measure success. For example Sweden’s anti-corruption network aims to change 
cultures and promote awareness for all types of corruption. Their goal is broad but that is ok, as 
long as the partners understand the goals clearly. Lastly, one caveat is that most types of corruption 
are interrelated. Thus it is advisable to use collaborations for tackling large systemic types of 
corruption and for punishing influential culprits for deterrence purposes. Norway and Singapore’s 




Who is best to collaborate with and how to manage the collaboration?  
 
For punishment and investigation, collaboration usually occurs between key government 
agencies. Varyingly, collaboration goes beyond working as usual but requires management of joint 
programs with some degree of resource and power sharing. For prevention and promotion of 
raising awareness work, collaboration across all sectors, government agencies, the private sector, 
and CSOs, would be more effective.  
 
For instance on punishment and investigation, in response to Sweden’s bankruptcy and tax fraud 
problems the Economic Crimes Bureau was setup in 1998. GRECO acknowledge this is an ‘excellent 
example of how prosecutors, police officers and experts – highly specialized and trained in 
combating economic and financial crimes – can work together’ (GRECO 2001, pp. 23). Formed out 
of the Unit for Special Crime within the Prosecutors-General ‘s Office, NACU is also an outcome of 
the network of government agencies working on corruption. Then NACU, itself, became the core 
node of the anti-corruption network.  
 
Another example is the how the Norwegian export agency and Norwegian embassies collaborated 
to provide advice that reliance on agents to gain access to certain markets by paying customs, 
regulators, and politicians is unacceptable (Søreide and Abramo 2008). These are ‘facilitation 
payments’ i.e. informal payments offered ‘to get things done’. Companies were in favor of this 
because it helped to reduce costs for the companies (Søreide and Abramo 2008). Eventually in 2003 
the Anti-Corruption Law changed. It used to be that bribery overseas was tax deductible but now it 
is 10 years in prison (Interview Swedish officials, 21 May 2008). In addition, Norway’s ministry of 
foreign affairs collaborated with the ministry for development assistance to open a hotline service 
in Norwegian embassies for people to report corruption of Norwegian development aid and 
businesses, which in effect helps to enforce the law.  
 
Prevention work, like drafting codes of conduct, is best to work with the private sector because of 
their sectorial expertise. There is passive and active bribery that involves public officials and 
private companies. Not only public interests are compromised but market incentives and fair 
competition is also jeopardized in the event of corruption. Also, many companies want to maintain 
a clean reputation for credit purposes. Failure to comply with regulations can cause a risk to their 
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reputation. Thus, it is in private companies interest to collaborate, if they are given the right 
incentives and direction.  
 
An example of collaboration with the private sector is when the Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise began addressing the issue of corruption in foreign countries since 1990s. This has 
motivated Norwegian firms to adopt preventive strategies (Søreide and Abramo 2008, pp. 12). As a 
result, Norway has spun off its work to include collaborating with private sector and CSOs overseas. 
The testimony to its efforts at collaboration comes from training workshops on dilemmas in 
decision-making held in Africa. Dilemma scenarios are such as what to do when government 
officials of a particular country demand bribe from you before you are allowed to bring in 
development projects and humanitarian aid (Interview TI Norway, 19 May 2008).  
 
Another success case is how the Swedish Institute to Combat Corruptive Practices, a non-profit, 
provided advice to the business sector and public authorities on bonuses in frequent flier schemes 
and payments by drug companies to medical experts. They eventually drew “The Use of Benefits to 
Promote Business Contacts and Relationships” for Sweden (GRECO Sweden, 2001).  
 
It is also possible to design a complex set of collaborative relationships. South Korea’s K-PACT 
network illustrates collaboration between politicians, ACA, private companies and CSOs that aims 
to achieve multiple goals.  The members understood clearly that efforts to combat corruption must 
be made in collaboration with all sectors, rather than creating a surveillance system of particular 
sectors (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007).  
 
KICAC, the main ACA at the time, was willing to collaborate with TI Korea to form K-PACT network 
because it hoped to have more power for prosecution and investigation similar to Singapore’s CPIB. 
It wanted TI Korea to help raise this issue to the public. The collaboration was so close that the 
former head of TI Korea became the Secretary General of K-PACT. But it was emphasized that TI 
Korea played a limited role in the network indicating that all actors were of equals in the 
collaboration (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007). Aside from sharing information, this 
shows how collaboration can enhance power of members and create opportunities to exchange 




Differing from other networks, K-PACT was set up as a permanent body. It had a council, an 
administrative office, a steering committee, an executive committee, and sub-committees to follow 
through the activities that included corruption in local government; codes of conduct of 
parliamentarians; social corporate governance; citizen participation and education. The aim was to 
work on punishment, prevention, and promotion all at once.  
 
The funding came from the government 25%, the parliament 25%, and the private companies 50%. 
While advocacy work and groundwork was carried out by CSOs. They also had a logo to brand the 
collaboration. It consists of four stripes in four colors of blue, sky blue, red and orange, representing 
the four sectors. The stripes crisscross and the diamond shaped hole in the middle depicted close 
ties among the sectors and transparency (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007). 
 
K-PACT’s case amplifies the importance having network core, a permanent office and stable 
streams of funding, aside from clear division for responsibilities and network goals. These factors 
made the collaboration continuous rather than ad hoc. The network made a highly visible impact by 
changing legislation and improving the perception of corruption in South Korea.  
 
When can cross-country collaborations be useful?  
Aside from providing learning opportunities for people from different contexts, 
international collaboration is useful to standardize laws, to push for compliance, and to solve 
particular cases (Søreide and Abramo 2008). For instance, Japan’s Ombudsman network was 
actually adopted from models in the U.S. and Sweden (Interview Japan Ombudsman, 21 December 
2007). The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is, in itself, an outcome of international collaboration.  
 
Regional networks, such as GRECO, play an important role to help form domestic networks.5 
Critiques of the GRECO include the fact that it lacks enforcement power (Warner 2007, p.161). 
However they have made key milestones recommendations such as Codes of Conduct for Public 
Officials, Common Rules against Corruption in the Funding of Politics Parties and Electoral 
Campaigns, and the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. These help 




Some collaboration is bilateral cooperation between governments. For instance, K-PACT of 
Southern Korea has close collaboration with the Indonesian government to transfer knowledge, 
especially on conducting corruption surveys (Interview K-PACT official, 18 December 2007).  
 
The close collaboration between Norwegian and Zambian governments is another prime example. 
Concerned about accountability of humanitarian aid, TI Norway started to build relationships in 
Africa and Asia. In 2002, the Zambian government established the Task Force on Corruption (TFC) 
to investigate cases against the former President Dr. Chiluba (Yambayamba 2006). Norway, 
together with Cooperating Partners (CPs) such as the Department for International Development 
(DFID), the Netherlands, Danish, Swedish, and Irish Embassies, supported the TFC financially, 
technically, and politically (Interview via email Norway Embassy in Zambia, 30 March 2009). In 
particular, Norway helped built the Financial Intelligence Unit and supported the Anti-Corruption 
Commission and other CSOs (Interview via email Norway Embassy in Zambia, 30 March 2009). This 
collaboration has accrued lasting dividends. Dr. Chiluba and others were tried in criminal court and 
the permanent secretary of the health ministry is serving a 5 years term. Zambia was also able to 
recover large amounts of stolen money (Interview via email Norway Embassy in Zambia, 30 March 
2009).  
 
Challenges to anti-corruption collaboration 
If collaboration seems like the right thing to do, why have agencies not collaborated more? 
Some of the reasons are the following. First, most punishment work deals with sensitive 
information that agencies are reluctant to share. This stems partly, from the lack of trust between 
agencies and the reality that some of the key agencies, like the police, are often culprits themselves. 
It can also be due to the need to protect sources of information and whistleblowers, and the 
competitive culture between agencies.  
 
Furthermore, working on international cases can hamper relations among nations. Advice and 
programs on anti-corruption funded or supported by another country can be interpreted as 
intervention in domestic affairs or violation of sovereignty. If the results are not favorable to the 
general public, it can cause long-term negative effects for the foreign countries involved. 
 
Second, most preventive work requires advocating for changes in legislations, regulations, and 
codes of conduct that goes beyond the capability and authority of organizations. It is very difficult 
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to get agencies to see eye-to-eye on issues and agree on priorities when it comes to ways to counter 
corruption, especially when there are overlaps and complexities regarding the type of corruption. 
Often a lead agency is missing or the incentive to collaborate is nonexistent. Furthermore, agencies 
are often pressured to show tangible results in a short-time frame but most awareness work takes a 
long time to yield results leading to organizations not wanting to invest resources. 
 
Lastly, CSOs are reluctant because they fear being co-opted by government. Many would rather 
remain as watchdogs than to take part in decision-making processes. As for the private sector, they 
need to see clearly how the collaboration would benefit their bottom-line – profit or reputation.  
Otherwise there is no incentive to collaborate.  
 
Implications for Practice 
Key lessons for practitioners are the following:  
1. The characteristic of the anti-corruption collaboration should match the types of corruption 
that it aims to tackle. This includes who to work with and how to work together. Sharing of 
resources, power, and information can go a long way.  
2. It takes time to build relationships, align goals, build trust, and gather resources for any 
kind of collaboration. The parameters of the collaboration must be clearly set and 
understood by all members. There should be an administrative structure or coordinating 
body to sustain the collaboration and maintain some formal presence.  
3. International bodies, funding agencies and governments can add collaboration to public 
agencies’ mandate. The funding can go to collaboration or network rather than a single 
agency. Performance information should reflect collaborative work.  
4. The collaboration should not rely solely on the political side of government and be 
influenced by the ups and downs of certain political factions. Anti-corruption work is 





This article argues that we cannot wait for political will to magically appear nor can we rely 
on a single agency to combat corruption. In this era of governance, the focus should shift to 
collaboration of anti-corruption institutions. We are now interested to design a web of actors in 
government, private and civil society sectors to be the architect of anti-corruption networks. This 
article has provided a more precise lens to understand the possibilities of anti-corruption 
collaboration. It has answered the questions of who the members can be, what they can work on, 
how the network can be managed and what are the challenges. The suggested framework is useful 
for analytical purposes as well as for practice. It is important to work with existing agencies and to 
have a clear idea of the type of corruption, the type of anti-corruption work, the purpose of 
collaboration and the nature of collaboration that one wishes to form. Each arrangement has its 
peculiar strengths and arises out of different contexts. 
 
Further research should be conducted to determine how to enhance collaborative capacity for anti-
corruption work. Comparative analyses of less successful countries and countries with federal 
systems would also be beneficial to validate the assumption that more collaboration contributes to 
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1 In 2013 the rankings were as follows: Finland and Sweden 3rd, Norway and Singapore 5th, Japan 18th, South Korea 46th.  
2 The CSOs are the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. In 1999 CSOs 
formed the Anti-Corruption Network in Korea, which later became Korea’s Chapter of TI. 
3 Follow-up interviews reveal that K-PACT has not been supported by the new regime in 2008. But the network continues to 
have impact such as on the anti-corruption law for election.  
4 GRECO stands for Group of States against Corruption (since 1999). As of 2013 it had 49 members states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
